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Introduction
For policy makers in the healthcare sector improving the quality of care and reducing costs have been of major interest in recent years, see McClellan (2011) . In particular, in case of overprovision both aims are not mutually exclusive as a reduction of medical treatment may increase patients' health benets and decrease costs for the healthcare payer, see Cutler and Ly (2011) . In practice, this is likely if the fee-for-service (FFS) is high, see e.g. Medicare in the US. Recent reforms targeting theses issues make use of nancial incentives for predetermined performance measures (pay-for-performance), see e.g. Rosenthal et al. (2004) for the US and Doran et al. (2006) for the UK, or non-monetary incentives that strengthen physicians' reputational motivation by improving public quality reporting, see e.g. Glazer et al. (2007) . The latter reforms are based on the empirical evidence that physicians actually care about their reputation and want to appear as good physicians.
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In the light of those reforms and along the lines of Siciliani (2009) we provide a theoretical framework with both monetary and non-monetary incentives for physicians. In contrast to Siciliani (2009) we focus on overprovision and reputational motivation. The monetary incentive is modeled by a FFS for each quantity of care. If we abstract from reputational motivation a higher FFS yields an increase in care since it increases physicians' marginal revenues. Concerning the reputational motivation we introduce a patient benet function which links the quantity of care and the corresponding patient benet. We assume that physicians are altruistic like in Ellis and McGuire (1986) and care about their reputation like in Bénabou and Tirole (2006) . As in Ellis and McGuire (1986) but in contrast to Siciliani (2009) we assume that patients are characterized by a peaked patient benet function which allows for both under-and overprovision of care. In case under-or overprovision is moderate physicians receive an extra utility gain since they are perceived as good type. This reputational motivation is dierent across physicians since they are heterogeneous in their degree of altruism. Physicians who are more altruistic adjust the quantity of care in order to be perceived as good while low altruism physicians maximize prots.
We use the model framework to derive comparative static results with respect to the total amount of care. We show that better reputational motivation unambiguously reduces the magnitude of overprovision which in turn increases patient benets and decreases costs of healthcare provision. We then introduce a measure for the eciency of the FFS scheme.
Intuitively, an eciency maximizing FFS trades o the physicians' demand for a high FFS (higher marginal revenues) with the patients' aim for a low FFS (less overprovision). We show that an eciency maximizing FFS exists and decreases if reputational motivation increases. For policy makers this can be an important result since promoting reputational motivation may actually increase patient benets and simultaneously decrease costs.
Model
Let q denote the quantity of medical treatment that a physician provides to a patient.
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Physicians dier in their degree of altruism θ as in Ellis and McGuire (1986) , where θ can take a continuum of values θ ∈ [ θ , θ ].
3 The corresponding density function is denoted by f (θ) while the cumulative density function is F (θ). For a physician the provision of q involves total costs C (q) with C q > 0 and C> 0. This cost function C includes all the monetary and non-monetary costs associated with the provision of q.
A patient benets from the provision of medical treatment q. Formally, the patient benet is denoted by B(q) and we assume that there exists a unique global maximum B(q * B ). Economically, if a physician provides q < q * B (q > q * B ) the patient suers from underprovision (overprovision).
A physician's remuneration is composed of a capitation T > 0 and a FFS p > 0, which are both nanced by the healthcare payer. Hence, prots are
(1) A physician's utility increases with prots π and an altruistic part that accounts for the patient benet, i.e. θB (q). Utility is therefore
Moreover, physicians care about their reputation among patients and other physicians.
Similar to Siciliani (2009) we assume that a physician is perceived as a good physician if the provided medical treatment q is within a reputation interval [ q , q ] with q * B ∈ [ q , q ]. Suciently strong underprovision q < q or overprovision q > q yield zero reputation. As 2 Note that q is not a measure for quality or performance as assumed in Eggleston (2005) or Siciliani (2009) . Quite in contrary, we focus on overprovision where a higher q implies lower quality for the patient.
3 Alternatively, it may also be interpreted as intrinsic motivation, see Besley and Gathak (2005) .
5 physicians enjoy being regarded as good they receive an extra gain in utility from reputation which we model as
with α, δ, w > 0 and λ = 1 if q ≥ q * B and λ = −1 otherwise.
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The higher α the more a physician enjoys being perceived as good. A higher δ reects a stronger stigma associated with providing care under nancial incentives. If a physician provides q * < q * B such that λ = −1, a higher p devalues reputation. In this case a higher q not only reects providing better medical treatment but also has a negative stigma associated with nancial incentives (greediness) to maximize revenues, see Le Grand (2003) . The situation is the opposite in case of overprovision with q * > q * B and λ = 1. In this case a physician providing less medical treatment can unambiguously be identied as a physician that cares more about patients and less about maximizing revenues.
The specication of reputation is discrete. This assumption may be justied as patients' judgments about physicians' abilities are not extremely accurate and they usually call them a good or bad physician. Like Siciliani (2009) we assume the dichotomous case, i.e., physicians are either good or not good. If a physician provides q ∈ [ q , q ] the extra gain from reputation yields a utility level of
In contrast, if the physician is not regarded as good utility U (θ, q / ∈ [ q , q ]) is given by (2). Now, consider a physician's maximization problem. The optimal medical treatment q * (θ) in case there is no extra utility gain from reputation (w = 0) is implicitly given by
More altruistic physicians provide relatively more (less) in case of underprovision (overprovision) since q * < q *
4 As in Siciliani (2009) we assume δp < α for λ = −1 to secure that the reputation gain is positive. We now explore how altruism shapes the physician's utility. In Figure 1 we focus on three types of physicians who dier in their degree of altruism θ 3 > θ 2 > θ 1 , with θ 3 being the type with the highest degree of altruism. Due to the extra gain from reputation a physician's utility function U (θ, q) has three discontinuities. The rst one at q = q and the one third at q = q. The utility jumps upwards (downwards) when a quantity weakly above q (q) is provided. The jump is due to the extra utility gain and equal to (α + λδp) w. Moreover, the utility jumps up at q = q * B since the sign of λ changes.
In the following we show that all types of physicians can be grouped into three cate- Figure 1 . If the physician chooses quantity q * (θ 3 ), she obtains a utility (point C) which is higher then the utility she would obtain if quantityq ≡ q was chosen (point C ). Deneθ as the level of altruism such that the provider is indierent between q * (θ) andq. We assume that q * (θ) <q, otherwise the group with high altruism would be empty. Then, physicians of high altruism type in the rangẽ θ < θ < θ provide output q * (θ) and receive utility V (θ, q * (θ)) + (α + δp) w.
If the physician's degree of altruism is below the thresholdθ, it follows q * (θ) >q.
Now the physician faces a trade-o. If she providesq, she gains a good reputation which increases her utility by (α + δp) w. However, providingq is costly (in terms of foregone revenue) as it is below q * (θ). The physician providesq if
i.e., if the additional utility from being perceived as a good physician is higher than the loss in utility from choosing quantityq instead of q * (θ). Since
we can conclude that physicians with a higher degree of altruism have a lower loss of utility from choosingq. We assume that for the physician with the lowest degree of altruism it is not optimal to provide quantityq. Then, there exists a level of altruismθ dened by U q U (θ 2 ,q)
Figure 1: Physician's utility function for dierent degrees of altruism V (θ, q * (θ)) − V (θ,q) = (α + δp) w such that physicians with a degree of altruism below (above)θ choose quantity q * (θ) (q). We refer to physicians in the rst group as low altruism physicians, and to the second group as physicians with intermediate levels of altruism.
As illustrated in Figure 1 , physician θ 1 obtains a higher utility by choosing quantity q * (θ 1 ) (point A) rather than quantityq (point A ). Physician θ 1 therefore belongs to the category of low-altruism physicians. In contrast, physician θ 2 obtains a higher utility by choosing quantityq (point B ) rather than quantity q * (θ 2 ) (point B). Physician θ 2 belongs to the category of physicians with intermediate altruism. Notice that even if a physician has a higher (but still intermediate) degree of altruism compared to provider θ 2 , she provides the same quantityq. Figure 2 illustrates the three dierent altruism groups and their optimal treatment levels for over-and underprovision. All groups overprovide (underprovide) while the magnitude of overprovision (underprovision) is most severe for the low altruism group.
As in Siciliani (2009) we consider the total amount of care across physicians (10) and derive comparative statics with respect to reputational motivation and the FFS. First,
Figure 2: Amount of care for dierent types.
assuming an uniform distribution for the degrees of altruism we obtain 5 dQ dw
Intuitively, better reputational motivation increases the incentive for low-altruism physicians to provideq which in turn decreasesθ. As illustrated in Figure 3 this reduces the magnitude of overprovision (area C).
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This implies the important result that the (variable) costs of healtcare provision (p Q) decrease with better reputational motivation. 7 Second, a higher FFS has an ambiguous eect on Q dQ dp 
In case the extra gain of reputation is suciently large, i.e., if δw > q * (θ) −q, an increase in p can lead to a lower Q. Intuitively, a higher p has two eects. First, an increase in p induces physicians with low and high altruism to increase output. Second, it changes 
